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Abstract 
 
The complex corporate environment and the large volumes of transactions are some 
of the reasons that render Internal Auditing a function vital to contemporary 
companies. Additionally, even though M&As provide various motives, evidence from 
the entire world has shown that most of the time they fail to create shareholders’ 
value. Despite that Internal Auditors’ involvement can have a positive impact during 
the M&A outcome, studies revealed that there are low levels of involvement.  
On the one hand, this study wishes to examine the role of Internal Auditors in Greek 
listed companies in the Athens Stock Exchange that proceed to the M&A process 
from 2015 to 2017. On the other hand, given M&As’ failure, it is also investigated 
whether companies’ create shareholders’ value the first year after the process 
realized. For these be tested, the questionnaire was sent to Internal Auditors of the 
sample companies and Economic Value Added, Cash Dividend Paid and D/E ratio 
have been applied as some of the shareholders’ value creation determinants. Finally, 
the study provided mixed results regarding both the questions. 
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Introduction 
Internal auditing’ evolution from its traditional to risk-based role rendered it an activity 
vital to modern business. Internal Audit Function is the key of company’s prosperity 
since it evaluate the effectiveness of the procedures, minimize the risk of 
misstatements on financial reporting and protect company’s assets providing an 
overall strong “defense system” to the company (Caratas et. al., 2014). Moreover, 
following the breakout of accounting scandals and investors’ increased demand for 
transparency, organizations became more focused on the Corporate Governance, 
effective oversight and sound Internal Controls (Carcello et. al, 2005). By playing a 
proactive role in Corporate Governance, Internal Audit Function, and various 
variables under its scope, can pipeline company’s stakeholders (Sarens et al., 2012). 
On the other hand, M&As represent a dynamic process of corporate strategy which 
impacts not only the shareholders but also on the whole community that operates. 
Due to their complexity, empirical evidence all over the world shown that M&As often 
fail to create value especially to shareholders of the acquiring firm. According to 
Selim et. al, (2003), failure can arise in any of the following M&A stage:  
1. Strategic planning 
2. Specific acquisition planning 
3. Deal structuring and negotiation 
4. Post-acquisition integration 
5. Post-acquisition audit. 
Papadakis et. al. (2010) examined Greek listed companies in the Athens Stock 
Exchange that procced to M&A activities from 1997 to 2003. Consistent with the 
public trend, their finding revealed that the failure rate of M&A ranges from 50% to 
60%. A more recent study, examined Greek listed companies’ post-performance from 
2005 to 2014, a time period prior and during the Greek Crisis, and concluded that 
mergers have negative impact on company’s performance regardless the time frame 
factor (Pazarskis et. al, 2018). Even though as it seems M&As fail to create 
shareholders’ value, according to PwC’s annual deals reports M&As in Greece have 
been increased during the last six years (from 2013 to 2018).  
M&A’s effectiveness affects not only the companies that participate in the 
transactions but also all the stakeholders. Moreover, Internal Auditing is 
characterized by many as the cornerstone of the modern business. Therefore, it is 
important to investigate Internal Auditing’ role and its contribution during the M&A 
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process. However, there has been little investigation regarding their relation. 
Specifically, their relation has been examined at International and European level 
from Selim et. al, (2003) and Dounis (2007) respectively, but it has never been 
examined in the Greece’s content. Thus, this paper targets to examine the role of 
Internal Auditors in Greek listed Companies that proceeded to M&As from 2015 to 
2017. Moreover, Internal Auditing’s main aim is to protect and enhance 
organizational value. Therefore, it would be of great interest to investigate the ability 
of these companies to create shareholders’ value. In order to accomplish that, 
Economic Value Added (EVA), Cash Dividend Paid and D/E ratio have been applied 
for the first year after the M&A is realized and compare to one year before the 
transaction. 
This study will provide useful insights in how Greek Internal Auditors regard their 
current role in M&A processes, which are the reasons that they may not involve, and 
how they envision their desirable role in order to provide an adding value activity. 
Additionally, given that this is one of the biggest issues of the M&A literature, is 
provided an insight on whether or not the process creates shareholder value. 
Given its unique and dual purpose, the paper broaches a subject that concerns both 
business world and to the academic community. First of all, it will give the opportunity 
to the top management to take a look into Internal Auditors’ perspective. Moreover, 
Internal Auditors themselves will be provided with opinions of how their colleagues 
perceive their role in M&As processes. Finally, from academic point of view it will be 
interesting because, as mentioned earlier, there has been little research with respect 
to this topic. 
The study includes the conceptual framework of the Internal Auditing, some useful 
notions about M&As, the role of the Internal Auditing in organizations, and the 
relation between the Internal Auditing and the M&A. Consequently, the sample 
selection process and the methodology approaches are thoroughly explicated. 
Whereupon, research findings are presented and discussed. Finally, the study’s 
conclusions, limitations, and further recommendations are furnished.  
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Literature Review 
This section is divided into three sub-sections, aiming to inform the readers about 
Internal Auditing’s conceptual framework, present some useful notions of M&As, and 
links the role of Internal Auditing in organizations with M&As.  
Internal Auditing 
This sub-section covers, among others, definitions, professional standards, and the 
Code of Ethics as stated by the Institute of Internal Auditors. Additionally, the 
importance of Internal Auditors safeguard their independence and objectivity 
highlighted. Internal Auditors’ relation to top management is also discussed.  
Definition, Aim and Mandatory Elements 
The Institute of Internal Auditors (hereafter, IIA) in the IIA’s International Professional 
Practices Framework (hereafter, IPPF), defines Internal Auditing1 as 
“an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value 
and improve an organization's operations. It helps an organization accomplish its 
objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the 
effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes.” 
According to the professional association (i.e. IIA), the mission2 of Internal Auditing is 
“to enhance and protect organizational value by providing risk-based and objective 
assurance, advice, and insight.” 
Internal Auditors (thereafter, IA) are expected to follow the mandatory elements3 of 
IPPF, a conceptual framework provided by the guidance-setting body i.e. IIA. The 
mandatory elements include: Core Principles for the Professional Practice of Internal 
Auditing, 
 Definition of Internal Auditing, 
 Code of Ethics, 
 International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.  
  
                                                          
1
 Retrieved from https://global.theiia.org/about/about-internal-auditing/Pages/About-Internal-
Auditing.aspx 
2
 Retrieved from https://global.theiia.org/standards-guidance/Pages/Standards-and-
Guidance-IPPF.aspx 
3
 Retrieved from https://global.theiia.org/standards-guidance/Pages/Standards-and-
Guidance-IPPF.aspx 
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Whereas, the Recommended Guidance incorporates: 
 Implementation Guidance, 
 Supplemental Guidance. 
From Traditional Role to Risk Based Role: The Evolution 
According to Griffiths (2005), the evolution of Internal Auditing can be separated into 
the following four stages. 
 Traditional. At its earliest stage, the Internal Auditing profession focused 
almost exclusively on financial activities. Compliance-oriented approach, with 
piles of transactions that needed to be reviewed and audited. This approach 
is characterized as a very time-consuming activity, with auditor’s 
independency be at stake. In more detail, the author reports that auditor’s 
duties were to review and approve payments before they were made.  
 Systems-Based. Under the System-Based Approach (SBA), auditors started 
to audit the organization’s processes and systems. An approach more 
focused on the adequacy of controls rather than reviewing large volumes of 
transactions.  
 Developmental. The risked-based approach is adopted. Auditors have access 
at any business level and now they focus on the organization’s objectives and 
the threats. At this point, they can emphasize what matters and on those 
issues that accountability could be compromised.  
 Forward-Looking. The perfect output of the risked-based approach is the 
internal auditors operate as advisors and mentors. Their reinforced role will 
render them solution facilitators, capable of undertaking consulting-type 
assignments. 
 
The Fourth Industrial Revolution (thereafter, 4IR) and the role of artificial intelligence 
(hereafter, AI) in the audit profession is a matter that raises great concerns. The 
president and CEO of the IIA Richard F. Chambers were asked, by the Forbes4 to 
answer whether AI can replace the internal auditors. Mr. Chambers reposed that “it is 
a myth that Internal Auditing can take the place of the internal auditor” and continued 
by adding that “It (AI) enables the auditor to be more efficient and effective in 
                                                          
4
 Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/workday/2017/07/10/how-humans-and-ai-
will-share-the-auditing-function-of-the-future/#5a86b3ef4fa1 
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addressing the problems of the organization”. In his article5 at “Internal Auditor,” Mr. 
Chambers also added that organizations aren’t ready for it (4IR). Chief Audit 
Executives (hereafter, CAE) should embrace the risks deriving from digital 
technologies and provide recommendations to top management and the board. 
Additionally, Mr. Chambers points out the evolution of the Internal Auditing profession 
during the years and its ability to be reshaped and adapted to new areas. Moreover, 
he states that 4IR will change forever the world as we know it. Closing, he 
emphasized that IIA leaders recognize the potential disruption deriving from AI and 
ensure that the body will set research and advice on the future of AI as an important 
priority in the year ahead. 
Ethics 
As it is previously mentioned, the Code of Ethics (hereafter, Code) is one of the 
mandatory elements included at IPPF issued by the IIA. The Code (2013, pp1, 2) 
includes the following principles: 
 Integrity. “The integrity of internal auditors establishes trust and thus provides 
the basis for reliance on their judgment”. 
 Objectivity. “Internal auditors exhibit the highest level of professional 
objectivity in gathering, evaluating, and communicating information about the 
activity or process being examined. Internal auditors make a balanced 
assessment of all the relevant circumstances and are not unduly influenced 
by their own interests or by others in forming judgments.” 
 Confidentiality. “Internal auditors respect the value and ownership of 
information they receive and do not disclose information without appropriate 
authority unless there is a legal or professional obligation to do so.” 
 Competency. “Internal auditors apply the knowledge, skills, and experience 
needed in the performance of internal audit services.” 
Independence and objectivity 
Independence and objectivity have always been fundamentals for the Internal 
Auditing profession. Their importance is highlighted by many practitioners, authors as 
well as other professional bodies. Okodo et. al (2019) argue that objectivity and 
independence are regarded as the milestones of auditing and compare their absence 
with “a giraffe without the neck” (Okodo et. al pp.4). As ISA 610 - Using the Work of 
Internal Auditors states external auditors, have to evaluate the degree of objectivity of 
                                                          
5
 Retrieved from https://iaonline.theiia.org/blogs/chambers/2017/Pages/Internal-Auditing-
and-the-Fourth-Industrial-Revolution.aspx 
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internal auditors, to use their work. Moreover, the dual role of internal auditors has 
been investigated among the first decade of the ‘00 (Brody et. al, (2000), Van 
Peursem (2004), Selim et. al (2009). The aforementioned studies have revealed 
mixed results on whether the dual role can influence internal auditors’ judgement. 
Selim et. (2009), investigated Italy and UK concluding that these results could be 
attributable to the type of consulting activity provided, the shareholding structure, 
each country’s corporate governance codes’ and the level that they are implemented. 
Their vitality is taken under consideration from IAA. The professional body has put 
great emphasis on these concepts by issuing Standards, practical guides, and 
advice.  
The Standard 1100 – Independence and Objectivity revised in 2017, dictates: 
“The internal audit activity must be independent, and internal auditors must be 
objective in performing their work.” 
Also, the IPPF decrees the concepts of the individual objectivity and the conflict of 
interest. According to Standard 1120- Individual Objectivity (2017 pg. 4): 
“Internal auditors must have an impartial, unbiased attitude and avoid any conflict of 
interest. 
Conflict of interest is a situation in which an internal auditor, who is in a position of 
trust, has a competing professional or personal interest. Such competing interests 
can make it difficult to fulfill his or her duties impartially. A conflict of interest exists 
even if no unethical or improper act results. A conflict of interest can create an 
appearance of impropriety that can undermine confidence in the internal auditor, the 
internal audit activity, and the profession. A conflict of interest could impair an 
individual's ability to perform his or her duties and responsibilities objectively.” 
Internal Auditors’ relation with Audit Committee 
The relationship between internal auditors and Audit Committee (hereafter, AC) has 
been highlighted by many authors and from the IIA. IIA states that the Audit 
Committee should engage in an open transparent relationship with CAE. According 
to Abbot et. al. (2010), the high extent of oversights on Internal Audit Function 
(thereafter, IAF) by the AC, decreases the risk of financial misstatement and 
increases the focus of the second on internal controls. Internal auditors view their 
interaction with AC as valuable support to the IAF (Zain et al. 2007). Goodwin et. al. 
(2001), also argue that AC can assist IAF and increase its independence. Although, 
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the author continues by emphasizing that internal auditor’s personal access to AC 
increases the possibility for the committee to be involved in the “hiring and firing” of 
the CAE. Contrary, Khelil et. al. (2016) argue that personal access to AC can 
positively influence CAE’s moral courage. 
Internal Auditor’s relation with the top Management 
Organizations’ stakeholders increasing demand for transparency and better 
governance have led to a thorough investigation of the interaction between internal 
auditors and top management (i.e. CFO, CEO), mainly in the first decade of the ‘00s. 
Carcello et. al. (2005), suggest that Enron’s and WorldCom’s scandals capture 
media’s and legislative bodies’ attention on how corporates are governed and on 
corporates’ control environment. Their findings revealed that during the period 2001 
to 2002 Internal Audit department’s staffing, budgets, meetings with AC and their 
length have increased. The IIA Standard 1110 – Organizational Independence (IIA, 
2017 pp.4) states that  
“The chief audit executive must report to a level within the organization that allows 
the internal audit activity to fulfill its responsibilities. The chief audit executive must 
confirm to the board, at least annually, the organizational independence of the 
internal audit activity.”  
Additionally, The IIA Standard 2060 - Reporting to Senior Management and Board 
(IIA, 2017 pp. 11,12) mandates that  
“The chief audit executive must report periodically to senior management and the 
board on the internal audit activity’s purpose, authority, responsibility, and 
performance relative to its plan and on its conformance with the Code of Ethics and 
the Standards (...)”.  
In practice, IA interacts with management concerning day-to-day activities (Sarens 
et. al. 2006). Additionally, their relationship can be described as intertwined. 
Management’ expectations can put significant influence on IA and when IA meets 
them face management’s support, as a result objectivity is at stake (Sarens et. al. 
2006). Christopher et. al. 2009, argue that top management’s participation in IAF’s 
budget planning threat IA independency. As claimed by the author, another threat to 
independency stems from managers’ perception regarding the utilization of IAF as a 
training ground for the next generation for managers. 
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Concepts for Mergers & Acquisitions 
Firstly, this sub-section provides some introductory concepts regarding M&As. 
Secondly, is briefly discussed M&A’s ability to create shareholders value. 
Useful Definitions 
Prateek Agarwal et. al (2014 pp.1,2) define merger as “a merger is considered to be 
a legal consolidation of two or more companies into one entity where the separate 
identities of both the companies are lost with the consequences resulting into not just 
accumulation of assets and liabilities of different companies but gaining several other 
benefits”. The authors continue by adding that “acquisition is taking over of one 
company by another where the target company still exists as a separate entity 
controlled by the acquirer.” Roberts et. al. (2012) argue that the main difference 
between mergers and acquisitions relies upon how the combination of the two 
companies realized. Most of the time, in mergers the two corporations are interested 
parties; they have already approached each other and both believe that the 
transaction will be proved beneficial and synergies are probable to arise. On the 
other hand, in acquisitions companies may find themselves acquired without any 
notice or prior negotiation. These cases in which the acquire buy a mass amount of 
target’s shares via various tactics are called hostile takeovers. Nevertheless, 
acquisitions can be agreed or friendly, when the target company is willing to be 
involved in the M&A transaction. 
Goal of M&A 
As introduced by Freeman in 1984, the stakeholder’s theory suggests that the 
organizations should aim not only to create shareholders’ value but also meet the 
expectation of all the groups of stakeholders. In the same rationale, M&A 
transactions’ main ambition is to produce higher returns on capital compared to what 
would do if they operate separately for benefit of the community that operates. 
According to Creighton (2013), in financial terms, the net present value of the 
combined corporation must be higher than the sum of the pre-acquisition value of 
each firm separately adding the acquisition cost. 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (𝐴 + 𝑇) > (𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴 + 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑇) 
Some motives to M&A 
The excess value generated by the combination of the two companies is called 
synergy. Synergies gains that are extracted from the business combination can be 
formed as cost-saving activities, improved efficiency, redeployment of surplus funds, 
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etc. (Brealey et al, 2014). Synergies are the aim of M&A transactions. As reported by 
DePamphilis (2010), synergies are divided into two basic categories, operating 
synergies and financial synergies 
 Operating Synergies include both economies of scale and economies of 
scope. In this type of synergy, the shareholders’ wealth creation can be 
achieved from both the improvement of managerial practices and by the 
efficient use of other factors. Economies of scale aim the allocation of fixed 
costs over a larger production line. When economies of scope aim to reduce 
the overheads over a larger production line and a greater variety of products. 
 Financial Synergies concern the impact of M&A on the cost of capital of the 
acquired firm or the newly incorporated firm. Usually, M&A transactions reflect 
a decrease of WACC.) 
 
Another motive to procced at M&A transactions is diversification. Similarly to the 
investing technique, corporations may prefer to invest in new areas or sectors, to 
hedge risk in their portfolios (Roberts et. al., 2012). At this point, it is worth to be 
mentioned that empirical evidence has concluded that investors do not benefit from 
unrelated diversification (DePamphilis, 2010). Additionally, shareholders are not in 
favor of companies investing in different organizations, since they can form their 
portfolios and claim the benefits from individual portfolio diversification (Bruner, 
2004).  
Various reasons can influence the decision to proceed to M&A activities. These can 
predominantly be classified into value-creation and managerial self-interest 
(Humphery-Jenner, 2013). Therefore, sometimes managers act in favor of their 
private interests rather than shareholders’ (Masulis et al. 2007). In more details, 
according to Shleifer et. al, (1989), sometimes managers choose a manager-specific 
investment, to make themselves valuable shareholders. Also, they may decide to 
engage in unprofitable M&A, to increase the firm’s size and thus not be taken over by 
other firms, the so-called “empire build” hypothesis (Gorton et. al. 2005). 
Value Creation 
The fact that M&A activities fail to create shareholders' value is one of the most well-
known and documented issues in finance literature (among others Mueller (1997), 
King et al. (2004), Agorastos et al. (2012). As Bruner (2004, pp.30) quotes to his 
book, a practitioner consultant in M&A stated that “only about 20% of all mergers are 
succeeded”. More recent papers showed that only a few corporations have 
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succeeded with M&A, mainly because they manage more effectively the acquisition 
plan and integration process (Hitt et. al. 2012). 
M&A activities are of the most popular strategic techniques providing numerous 
advantages. Although, many pitfalls lurk and they can lead to bad post-performance 
M&A. Lack of adequate planning, poor post-closing integration problems, overvalued 
synergies and expectations which turn out fallacious are some of them (Sherman  
2006). After reviewing 89 studies from 1983 to 2008, divided into two periods 1983-
2003 and 2004-2008, Hitt et. al. (2012) gathered research variables representing the 
requirements for value creation (indicatively: firm size, diversification/relatedness, 
method of payments). They conclude that it is important to consider more complex 
relationships between the aforementioned requirements. Contrary to the 
aforementioned papers, Alexandidris et. al (2017) suggest that the 2008 financial 
crisis and the enhanced role of corporate governance helped reverse the 
deterioration of value creation for acquiring firms. In more detail, acquisitions took 
place during 2010 – 2015 generate positive abnormal returns and the gains derived 
from synergies present a dramatic increase. 
The role of Internal Auditing and Mergers & Acquisitions 
This sub-section refers to the agency theory as an inherent challenge in 
organizations, the role of Internal Auditors in modern organizations and in M&A 
processes. Moreover, is provided a brief literature review regarding major and 
minority shareholders’ rights protection. Finally, are presented some aspects of the 
Hellenic Corporate Governance Code’s assessment.  
Agency Theory 
The agency problem deriving from the separation of ownership and control, stated by 
Berle et. al, (1932), refers to the conflict arise between the management (agency) 
and shareholders (principal). Information asymmetry between the agency and the 
principle can lead individuals to take self-interest action at the expense of 
shareholders' wealth. 
As it is mentioned, the academic community put great emphasis on what are the 
main reasons for a company to proceed to M&A activities. Evidences support that 
many M&A realized by agency motives and hubris (Berkovich. et. al, 1993). 
Moreover, as proposed by Parvinen et. al, (2007), incentive asymmetries between 
stakeholders and M&A’s outcomes can result in a subversive post-integration plan, 
non-objective evaluations and increases on acquisition prices. 
11 
 
Hellenic Corporate Governance Code and Shareholders’ Rights Protection 
A survey conducted by McKinsey & Company in 2000 has shown that investors are 
willing to pay more for buying shares of “well-governed companies”. This premium 
paid varies from country to country depending on the shareholders’ rights, the extent 
to which Corporate Governance (thereafter, CG) practices are implemented and the 
financial disclosures. In more detail, investors offer higher premiums for countries 
that provide weaker legal protection and vice versa. Therefore, the regulatory bodies 
try to provide a stronger corporate environment by continually reinforcing CG Codes.  
According to the European Bank’s Corporate Governance Greece Country Report for 
the year 2016, Greece’s CG code is assessed as fair and shareholders’ rights as 
moderately strong. Briefly, as far as CG code concerns, is stated that weaknesses lie 
on: 
 “Comply or explain” approach 
 Quality of disclosures on code’s compliance, specifically are often “copy and 
paste” 
 Little evidence when referring to the Code’s implementation  
 Omission of “rights and obligation” part of the Code.  
 
As for shareholder’s rights, the category is divided into four sub-categories6, with 
three out of four assessed as moderated and one out of four fair. The Hellenic CG 
Code7 recognize that the Greek listed companies are controlled by specific major 
shareholders and clearly states that board members must manage conflicts of 
interest arising between major and minority shareholders. Antoniadis et. al. (2008), 
examine the relationship between ownership structure, CG mechanisms, and agency 
problem in Greece during the financial crisis of 1999-2001. Their results showed that 
ownership concentration leads to deterioration of firm’s value stating that this can be 
attributable to minority shareholders value expropriation. Also, the authors pointed 
out the low levels of the legal protection of minority shareholders' interests and the 
absence of corporate governance techniques. Moreover, Lazarides (2011, pp. 8), 
argues that “minority shareholders have no “voice” option.” He adds that Greece 
doesn’t provide mechanisms such as cumulative voting to give minority shareholders 
                                                          
6
 4.1 “General Shareholders’ Meeting (GSM).” Moderate 
  4.2.” Protection against Insider Trading and Self-dealing.” Moderate 
  4.3. “Minority Shareholders Protection and Shareholders’ Access to Information.” Moderate 
  4.4. “Registration of Shareholdings.” Fair 
7
 Retrieved from: http://www.ebrd.com/documents/ogc/greece.pdf 
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the power to appoint and nominate directors. The author concludes that Greece and 
other small countries in the European Union have to adjust their national legal 
frameworks. 
The role of Internal Auditors in Organizations 
Effective enterprise’s risk-management (thereafter, ERM) is vital for modern 
enterprises in order to continue operate and succeed. Effectives can be 
described as a company’s ability to establish an ERM which not only cope 
with current risks but also prepare for other potential (Messier et. al., 2012). In 
more details, according to Roth J. (as cited in Messier et. al., 2012, pp. 779) 
the different processes exercised by IAF can be illustrated at the following 
picture. 
 
Figure 0—1 DuPont's IAF Product Wheel 
Source: Reprinted from Auditing & assurance services: A systematic approach, by Messier, W. F., 
Glover, S. M., & Prawitt, D. F., (2012), MA: McGraw-Hill Irwin. 
13 
 
Although BoD and CEO are responsible for establishing and monitoring ERM’s 
processes and strategies, IAF participation is vital to ensure its effectiveness. In 
order for the company’s top management fulfills their duties, should seek assurance 
from inside the company (Guidance on the 8th EU Company Law Directive, part 2, 
2010). This kind of assurance can be provided by the IAF and by acting as the third 
line of companies’ defense. 
 
Figure 0—2 Three Lines of Defense Model 
Source: ECIIA/FERMA Guidance on the 8th EU Company Law Directive, article 41 
IAF through the risk-based approach assures the organization’s ability to effectively 
assess and manage its risks. IAF’s role is to review how the first and the second lines 
are operating and communicate the detected deficiencies to companies’ governing 
bodies. In more detail, IAF’s insurance task is to cover the whole spectrum of the 
organization’s risk management framework, including risk identification, assessment 
and the proposal of the corresponding to risk responses. Moreover, IAF’s aim is to 
enhance and protect organizational value and thus shareholder’s value. As stated to 
IIA’s Standard 2120.A2 – Risk management, IAF must evaluate the potential 
occurrence of fraud the how the organization manages fraud risk. The 12th Global 
Fraud Survey conducted by Ernst & Young revealed that BoD and AC continue to 
face challenges in addressing the risks of fraud, bribery, and corruption. Among 
others, the responders were asked how frequently they conducted DD into fraud 
and/or corruption-related risks in the last two years before the acquisition and the last 
two year post the acquisition. 68% and 58% of those asked response always, very 
frequently and fairly frequently for pre-acquisition and post-acquisition respectively. 
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Internal Audit and M&As 
It is vital IAF understand the organization’s value drivers and prospects for the future. 
On the other hand, M&A represent a dynamic process for corporate culture and 
strategy which impacts not only the shareholders but also on the whole community 
that operates. The IA involvement in the M&A process is a subject that lacks 
thorough investigation. As reported by Cook (1993), IAF can have a significant 
contribution to M&A by increasing management quality and business profitability. He 
continues by adding that the potential contribution depends on the department’s 
scope, the available resources and its level of authorization to records and 
personnel. His results revealed that IAF's involvement at the pre-acquisition stage is 
crucial for the effectiveness of M&A activities and the need for IAF’s participation as 
soon as possible. Brody et. al. (2000) examined IAF’s ability to remain objective 
based on companies’ roles (the buyer or seller). The study concludes that the role 
can influence participants' judgment during the negotiation process, thus auditor’s 
objectivity may be impaired. Selim et. al. (2003), investigated the role of internal 
auditors at M&A and divestitures during the whole process on international base. His 
results revealed that IAF had low levels of involvement. The study also emphasizes 
the internal auditor’s desire to adopt a more pro-active role and get involved in as 
earlier as possible. In the same contend, Dounis (2007) examined the internal 
auditors' involvement in the European base. One of the study’s scopes was to 
explain the gap between internal auditors’ actual and desired role a more proactive 
one. The results have shown that internal auditors can provide adding value activities 
to M&A processes. Although, in order to a more expanded role be achieved 
management’s perception about internal auditors’ ideal role should change and IAF’s 
personnel skills, knowledge, and quality be enhanced. EY’s publication in April 2013, 
once more points out the importance of IA be involved at M&A and divestitures. The 
publication suggests that IA among others can assess the organization’s readiness 
for the transaction, warn about potential risks or pitfalls that can cause the firm to 
overpay or undervalue and prevent deal value leakage. 
Methodology 
This research aims to investigate the role of the Internal Auditors during the M&A 
activities and shareholders’ value creation (thereafter, SVC) of the companies that 
are listed at the Athens Stock Exchange. For internal auditors’ involvement to be 
examined, questionnaires were sent via e-mail to the corresponding department’s 
personnel of a sample of companies. Moreover, SVC has been tested by the use 
15 
 
of Economic Value Added (thereafter, EVA®8), Debt to Equity ratio (thereafter, D/E) 
and cash dividends paid each year9. 
Sample Selection 
The sample is derived from Hellenic’s Capital Market Committee (thereafter, HCMC) 
Annual Reports for the years under scrutiny. HCMC includes in each year’s report 
the companies that have proceeded to public bid-offer for buying shares traded to 
Athens Stock exchange. During the years 2015 to 2017 44 transactions were 
reported to the corresponding annual reports. The initial sample was composed of 40 
companies during the period 2015 to 2017. As is previously mentioned this study 
examines companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange, thus companies that were 
not listed to AΤΗΕΧ were excluded from the sample (two companies). Due to their 
nature conglomerate and investment management companies were excluded from 
both questionnaire’s sample, and SVC measures (EVA’s calculations, D/E, dividends 
paid) (nine in total). One is no longer operate thus it was excluded only from the 
questionnaire. Also, Banks have been excluded from post-M&A calculations (three 
banks in total), since their performance is tested against other metrics. To provide a 
more accurate EVA estimation an additional criterion should be taken into account. In 
consistence with Healy et. al. 1992, Sirower et. al. 1998, Yook, 2004 the acquiring 
firms that have procced in another M&A activity the years under scrutiny where 
excluded (three companies). Additionally, to be able to extract a more holistic and 
solid conclusions these companies have been excluded from the other post-M&A 
performance metrics too. One more firm was excluded from all post-M&A 
performance measurements because the firm was incorporated after the merge of 
the two companies (no available comparable). Therefore, the final sample was 
carved out with 28 questionnaires sent and SVC metrics (i.e. EVA, D/E and dividends 
paid) are calculated for 22 companies.  
 
Questionnaires 
The questionnaire is divided into three stages. The first one includes three 
introductory questions where the responders were called to choose the type of 
                                                          
8
 EVA® is registered trademark of the Stern Stewart CO. (More details on: 
https://trademarks.justia.com/744/04/eva-74404471.html) 
9
 Derived from companies’ press releases and ATHEX, Retrieved from: 
https://www.athexgroup.gr/el/companies-cash-
distributions?p_p_id=dividendsportlet_WAR_HelexServiceportlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&_divide
ndsportlet_WAR_HelexServiceportlet_showCompany=-1 
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organization, years of experience and the level of education. The second stage 
comprises 29 close-ended questions in a five-point Likert scale analysis. The third 
stage is optional, where three open-ended questions are included. At this optional 
stage IA were called to describe:  
 
 Their current role at the M&A process. 
 Their opinion on which are the main reasons why Internal Auditors don’t 
involve at M&A process. 
 The desire role that Internal Auditors can play at M&A process, in order to 
provide a proactive "adding-value" activity. 
 
The Questionnaire is based on M&A’s macro model as is developed by Selim et. al. 
(2003). More specifically, the questions correspond to each stage of the Macro 
Model, aiming to provide internal auditor’s view about their current role at M&A. The 
macro model is divided into five stages: 
 
Strategic Planning. This stage concerns the corporate development process. In other 
words, corporate’s value-drivers, potentials, risks, and objectives. In recent years 
companies seem to have shifted from Porter’s five competitive forces approach to 
determine the company’s weakness and strengths to resource-based view (RBV). In 
more detail, these resources can be tangible, human, intangible, organizational or 
technological (Barney et. al. 2001). The challenge at this stage lies not only at the 
acquiring company being conscious of its resources and capabilities but also for its 
ability to detect the target’s company resources and capabilities. Therefore, the 
valuation process can be misled, integration failure can be increased and expected 
synergies’ gains never be realized.  
 
Specific-Acquisition Planning. Candidates’ target selection process begins by 
screening various perspectives. The main components of the candidate’s list 
are strategic evaluation and value creation logic. Strategic evaluation is regarded 
whether the intended target’s company resources and capabilities will fit the 
acquirer’s and sustain its competitive advantages. Value creation logic aims to 
produce returns over the cost of capital. Moreover, companies need to bear in their 
minds that the criteria chosen, should not only aim to the suitability of each target but 
also their availability at the right price through the formation of a proper deal 
structure. 
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Deal Structuring. Advisors are appointed, negotiations and “exit” price are 
determined, bid and defense strategies are formed conforming the corresponding 
regulatory regime. Due Diligence (thereafter, DD) process is included, the need for 
thorough investigations on target’s risk and the creation of realistic future growth 
expectations become vital. There are many at stake at this stage, since intangible 
assets misevaluation (including goodwill), inappropriate payment method, 
elusive synergies gains and wrong assessment of targets current and potential risk 
will have serious consequences to shareholders' value.  
 
Post-Acquisition Integration. Consist of the most important stages, because the 
newly merged company should fulfill the initial strategic and value expectation that 
originally drove the M&A to happen. At this point many things can go wrong, changes 
to both companies and the creation of merged companies require well-organized 
plans, meet of the KPI’s, deadlines, etc. Other issues that need to be taken under 
great consideration are key personnel and customer retention. 
 
Post-Acquisition Audit. Despite its importance, this part is often bypassed by the 
companies. Given the high level of failure for companies to create shareholders’ 
value, this stage should be seen as a lesson for future M&As. Companies need to 
learn from the past and become more familiar with these business strategies. It is 
also emphasized by the authors, that internal auditors can provide a significant 
contribution to this stage either by conducting special purposes audits i.e. acquisition-
specific, or include it as part of the annual audit plan.  
Economic Value Added 
EVA is an alternative measure of financial performance and value creation for 
shareholders, introduced by Stewart and Stern in 199110. According to Stewart 
(1994), EVA is described as a managerial tool which operates as a decision-making 
framework and assists the creation of sustainable value for all the stakeholders. 
Moreover, in the aforementioned article, it is argued that EVA is at nearly 50% able to 
explain changes in shareholders' values compared to its accounting-based rivals 
(mainly compared to EPS). Additionally, positive EVA values mean that companies 
create shareholders’ value, while negative EVA destroys (Sharma, 2015). Moreover, 
as stated by O’Byrne (1996),  EVA improvements can gain understandings of 
                                                          
10
  Retrieved from: https://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/stern-stewart-eva 
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investors’ expectations that are embedded into the company’s current stock price. In 
more detail, positive EVA consists of a sign of future EVA improvements since a 
company that is growing can produce improved EVA by paying the current rate of 
return. Also, the author states that this feature can be useful not only for analysts but 
also for the Remuneration Committees by setting EVA as a performance measure. 
However, findings from the Greek stock market indicated that earnings levels and 
earnings changes can better explain stock returns compared to EVA (Maditinos et. 
al., 2006). EVA has also been used for examining post-M&A performance. 
Accounting ratios measuring the rate of returns and companies’ profitability are 
usually censured for being susceptible to manipulation. The newly announced metric 
(i.e. EVA) seems to overcome these and is seen as a true performance measure 
(Yook, 2004). According to Xiao et. al. 2009, point out that its biggest advantage is 
that it can provide a more accurate reflection of the enterprise’s real values.  
Calculating EVA 
EVA calculation consists of the organization’s NOPAT (Net Operating Profit after 
Tax) minus Capital Invested multiplied by the company’s Cost of Capital.  
 
𝐸𝑉𝐴 = 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑇 − (𝐶𝑜𝐶 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑) 
For determining EVA the following equations and assumptions are used: 
 
NOPAT. It can be calculated as 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 − (1 ∗ 𝑇), where 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 is Earning Before 
Interest and Taxes or organization’s operating profit and T is corporate tax rate. 
 
Cost of Capital. When calculating the Cost of Capital for public companies is mostly 
computed as the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC). For companies that are 
financed solely with debt and equity the WACC is determined by the following 
formula: 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =  
𝐷
𝐷 + 𝐸
∗ 𝑟𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇) +
𝐸
𝐷 + 𝐸
∗ 𝑟𝑒 
   
Where D depicts Debt, E represents Equity, 𝑟𝑑 and 𝑟𝑒 are defined by the company’s 
capital structure.  
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Cost of debt or 𝑟𝑑 reflects the company’s cost for issuing of new debt. The company’s 
cost of debt can be estimated through several ways and it mostly depends on its 
creditworthiness. A commonly used approach for estimating 𝑟𝑑 is the synthetic rating 
approach11. Under this approach, the 𝑟𝑑 can be estimated by the utilization of a 
company’s financial characteristics. In its most simple form, the rating can be 
computed by the use of the Interest Coverage ratio12, the corresponding estimated 
bond rating and the credit default spread (CDS). In more detail, to extract the 
company’s CDS the interest coverage ratio result is matched to the corresponding 
estimated bond rating which is matched to the CDS for each year. Afterward, the 
estimated company’s CDS is added to country’s risk-free rate of return. The rationale 
behind this approach is to estimate companies’ creditworthiness by providing an 
estimation on their CDS and by adding the risk-free rate of the economies that 
companies’ are operating. 
 
Although is criticized by many for its practical application, Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) is one of the most commonly used methods for estimating a company’s cost 
of equity or 𝑟𝑒. The CAMP was introduced by Markowitz and Sharpe and constitutes 
a special example of the Markowitz portfolio theory developed in 1952. CAPM 
general form when applied for is the following: 
 
𝑟𝑒 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑒) 
   
Where 𝑟𝑓 stands for the risk-free rate of return, 𝛽 depicts the company’s beta factor 
and the (𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑒), the so-called market risk premium. 
 
Capital Invested. Comprises a company’s funds that are used to raise its key 
operations. It can be computed as the sum of the company’s Long-Term 
Debt, preferred stock at carrying value, minority interest and total common 
equity, excluding deferred income tax reserves and investment tax credit. 
 
In this study, EVA is used to measure companies’ financial performance. Given the 
high rates of M&A failure to create shareholders’ value in order to compare 
companies’ ability to generate profit EVA and the other post-M&A metrics were 
applied for one-year prior to M&A is reported to HCMC’s annual reports and one-year 
                                                          
11
 Retrieved from: http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/podcasts/valfall16/valsession7.pdf 
12
  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠⁄  
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after the M&A. For EVA calculation the acquiring company’s financials used, were 
derived from companies’ annual reports and Amadeus database. Moreover, for 
comparability purposes, each company’s EVA for each year was benchmarked with 
EVA by the industry for Western Europe, which stemmed from prof. Damodaran 
online database13. Also, prof. Damodaran online database were used to find the 
estimated bond ratings with the corresponding CDS, the Greek market risk premiums 
for each year. For the risk-free rate of return, the 6-month yield of Greek Treasury 
bills was used. The Greek corporate tax rates were obtained from the KPMG tax 
database14.  Finally, companies’ WACC was derived either from independent 
analyst’s estimations or companies’ annual reports and when none of the 
aforementioned were available was calculated as it was previously mentioned. 
Capital Structure and Dividends paid 
Capital Structure refers to the fusion of equity, debt or hybrid securities that a 
company uses to finance its assets. Even though is completely theoretical since it 
disregards major factors that influence capital structure decisions, the Modigliani & 
Miller theory sets the foundations of modern thinking as far as capital structure 
concerns. According to the theorem, in an efficient market and absence of 
asymmetric information, taxes bankruptcy and agency costs, the firm’s capital 
structure is irrelevant to its value. On the other hand, the trade-off theory, suggests 
that the optimal mix of debt and equity results in a firm’s overall value maximization. 
In more detail, the theory states that debt financing can help the company benefit 
from tax-shield but up to a point. Excessive debt financing can lead to bankruptcy 
costs and the cost of financial distress appearances. Therefore, value maximization 
can be achieved by forming the optimal mix of debt to equity to benefit from tax-
shield (debt) but not allow bankruptcy and financial distress costs exist. Moreover, 
numerous studies have tried to explain the Dividend Signaling (indicatively 
Woolridge, 1982, Bajaj et. al, 1990, Grullon et. al., 2004, Ha et. al., 2011). Signaling 
theory suggests that companies convey signals via their payout policies. They try to 
“signal” potential investors, shareholders, analysts, and the market about the 
company’s financial conditions and perspectives. Regarding cash dividends, 
shareholders' seem to concern for sustained dividend prices and not for the 
dividends’ fluctuations (Brealey et. al. 2014). According to Sharma et al. (2015), 
dividends and capital structure are aspects that can impact shareholders' value 
                                                          
13
 Retrieved from: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ 
14
 Retrieved from: https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-
rates-online/corporate-tax-rates-table.html 
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creation. Moreover, the authors add that companies with positive EVA values seem 
to care not only for profits but also for wealth maximization. Consistent with Sharma 
et. al. (2015), this study aims to examine SVC by the use of cash dividends paid, D/E 
for testing capital structure and EVA for one year before and one year after the M&A. 
Data Findings 
In this section, questionnaires’ and Shareholders’ value creation findings’ are 
presented, separated into two sub-sections.  
Questionnaires’ Findings 
As it is mentioned in the previous chapter, the final sample for the questionnaires is 
28 companies. After communicating with the companies and my specific request for 
providing emails’ of Internal Audit department personnel the final number of 
questionnaires that have been responded is nine (9) in totals (response rate at 
32.14%). From communication with companies, some very interesting findings have 
emerged. Two companies out of 28 do not have Internal Audit Department. However, 
one of the two is not obliged to have an Internal Audit department since the year 
2017 was delisted from the ATHEX. Moreover, in two companies out of 28, IAF was 
conducted by the mother company’s IAF. Moreover, internal auditors of two 
companies out of 28 claimed that Internal Auditors do not involve at all to the M&A 
process. In more detail, the Internal Auditor of the one company stated that the M&A 
process is conducted by companies that provide professional services (usually Big 4) 
while the external advisors only raise some typical questions to Internal Auditors and 
after the M&A process finished Internal Auditors were fired. Finally, during the 
communication with the Internal Auditors, it was being clear that the questionnaire 
does not include any questions that can infer to any confidential information and that 
the research is conducted under full anonymity, some Internal Auditors were 
reluctant and one of them refuse to answer it. 
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Analysis of Questionnaire findings 
Introductory questions. 
 
Question 1. Sector 
The responses are belonging to five sectors. The bank sector includes three 
companies. Services and constructions & basic materials sectors include two 
companies each. Metal Steel Products and Real Estate Investment Services include 
one company each.  
 
Question 2. Level of education 
The vast majority (88.9%) of our responders hold a Master’s Degree. While only one 
(11.1%) of them hold Bachelor’s Degree and none of them hold a Ph.D. 
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Question 3. Years of Experience 
Similar to the previous graph eight out of nine responders (88.9%) have more than 
10 years of working experience, while only one (11.1%) have from five to ten. 
Stage 1 of M&A macro model. Strategic Planning 
 
Question 4. Internal Auditors understanding on company's strategy 
This question aims to reveal Internal Auditors’ opinions about their understanding of 
the company’s strategy, weak points and potentials. As we can observe almost all of 
our responders strongly believe that they are aware of the company’s overall 
strategy. 
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Question 5. Internal Auditors' accessibility to information 
This question focuses on Internal Auditors relations with top management. Our 
sample believes that top management provides insights about the company’s 
strategy to Internal Auditors. Although, the percentages are slightly different from the 
previous with the 55.6% strongly agree with the statement and the 44.4% agree. 
 
Question 6. Understanding of M&A's aims 
The purposes of proceeding to M&A transactions are clear for the majority of the 
Internal Auditors. One out of 9 (11.1%) states that neither agree nor disagree.  
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Question 7. Right time for proceeding to M&A 
Internal Auditors were asked whether they can assess, by the use of auditing tools, 
the company’s readiness for proceeding to M&A. The responses were almost 
divided, with the 55.5% state that either agree or strongly agree and with the 44.4% 
either be neutral or disagree. 
 
Question 8. Internal Auditors' ability to influence M&A dicision 
At this point, the question aims to examine Internal Auditor’s power to influence top 
management to either proceed or not to M&A. 55.5% of the responders either 
disagree or are neutral to this statement. And the 44.4% either agree or strongly 
agree.  
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Stage 2 of M&A macro model. Specific Acquisition Planning 
 
Question 9. Company's objectives for M&A are reflected to candidates' list 
The vast majority of responders (88.8%) believe that candidate companies reflect the 
initial company’s objectives to proceed to M&A activity. Although, one out of nine 
(11.1%) disagree with the statement.  
 
Question 10. Internal Auditors' ability to mitigate conflicts 
We see fragmented responses to this question. The aim was to screen Internal 
Auditors’ view about their power to intervene and mitigate conflicts that may arise, to 
assist the company in fulfilling its initial objectives for proceeding to M&A. The 66.6% 
either agree or strongly agree with the statement. When 22.2% are neutral and 
11.1% strongly disagree with the statement. 
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Question 11. Valuation techniques 
Mixed results are presented to this question. Although most of the responses (66.6%) 
agree and strongly agree with the statement, 33.3% disagree or strongly disagree.  
 
Question 12. Valuation Approach applied 
To provide a more realist valuation, the right valuation approach must be used. 
Therefore, depending on each candidate’s resources and capabilities the appropriate 
valuation approach should be used. The higher percent (77.8%) of the responders 
agree or strongly agree with the statement. While one out of nine strongly disagree 
and one out of nine neither agree nor disagree. 
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Question 13. Internal Auditors' accessibility to candidates' control environment 
Tried to divulge the Internal Auditors’ accessibility to candidates’ control environment 
and their ability to assess it, we can see the responses to the question are similar to 
the previous. One Internal Auditor shift from the agree option to the neutral.  
 
 
Question 14. Assess and quantify the risk of failure 
When asked about Internal Auditors’ ability to quantify and assess the risk of failure, 
77.8% agree and strongly agree with the statement. 
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Question 15. Internal Audit Department's involvement at this stage 
As far as Internal Auditors’ involvement concern, almost half (44.4%) of those 
questioned have stated that neither agree nor disagree. 33.3% agree and strongly 
agree while 22.2% disagree and strongly disagree. It can be seen that this question 
has bisected the responders.   
 
Question 16. Deal structure planning 
The vast majority (77.7%) agree and strongly agree when asked whether they 
believe that an adequate deal structure plan is prepared at this stage. While two out 
of nine respondents are neutral and strongly disagree with the statement. 
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Question 17. Internal Audit Department's personnel 
This question intends to explore Internal Auditors’ views on whether the department 
is staffed with those people who have the appropriate skills and expertise to support 
deal structure planning. We can observe that our responses present a uniformity 
since the 55.5% agree and strongly agree with the statement and the 44.4% is 
neutral. 
Stage 3 of M&A macro model. Deal Structuring 
 
Question 18. Senior Managers' Involvement on DD process 
This question points out the importance of managers be present during the DD 
process. The rationale behind is that each department’s manager is the one that 
understands better the risks that can be lurk at target companies’ corresponding 
department. Similar to the previous question our responses are neutral, agree and 
strongly agree. Although, Internal Auditors seem to be more “sure” about their 
responses since we can observe a shift from the neutral to agree and strongly agree.  
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Question 19. Internal Auditors' ability to provide an objective bid offer 
We can see that all the possible responses have been used. Five out of nine (55.5%) 
agree and strongly agree that Internal Auditors can act as consultants to their 
company and provide a fair estimation on the bid-offer. While three out of nine 
(33.3%) disagree and strongly disagree. 
 
Question 20. Screen of targes' company third parties 
The majority (77.7%) agree and strongly agree that it is important to review the 
target’s company third parties. While two out of nine stated that they are neutral and 
strongly disagree. 
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Question 21. Employees turnover risk 
The 77.8% believe that during the DD process it is important to mitigate turnover risk. 
Two out of nine stated that they are neutral and strongly disagree. 
 
Question 22. Internal Auditors' ability to assist top management to meet M&A's objectives 
The rationale behind the question is to present Internal Auditors’ perception about 
their ability to keep the M&A process in the track. In other words, to help M&A 
objective be fulfilled and provide alternative scenarios about the risks and responses 
that may arise. The vast majority (88.9%) agree and strongly disagree with the 
statement. 
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Question 23. The current DD process provides understanding of the target company 
Internal Auditors were asked whether they believe that the DD process that has 
already be in place provide understanding of the target company. The responses are 
the same as those of the previous question. 
 
Question 24. Consulting role of Internal Auditors at "walk-away" strategy 
Internal Auditors believe that they use their consulting role and assist the “walk-away” 
strategy.  
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Question 25. Internal Auditors' presence on negotiation meetings 
The purpose of this question is to scrutinize Internal Auditor’s opinion concerning the 
objectivity principle. 44.4% agree and strongly agree that internal auditors’ presence 
in negotiations can be used as a useful tool. On the other hand, 33.3% disagree and 
strongly disagree. 
Stage 4 of M&A macro model. Post-Acquisition Integration 
 
Question 26. Internal Auditors' involvement in Post-acquisition integration 
The respondents believe that the Internal Auditors’ involvement in Post-acquisition 
integration is adequate. 
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Question 27. Internal Auditors' ability to review and enhance company's Integration plan 
Internal Auditors think that they can assist the effectiveness of the company’s 
integration plan. 
 
Question 28. Initial value expectations be preserved during the Post-acquisition plan 
Most of the respondents (88.9%) think that they can assist the organization to meet 
its initial value expectations. In other words, this question seeks to Internal Auditors’ 
view on whether they can utilize that auditing tools to safeguard those value 
expectations that are formed to the initial stages of M&A models will be met. 
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Question 29. Internal Auditors safeguard that companies operate smoothly 
Taking into account the radical changes that happen to both companies, of the 
greatest challenges is to maintain key employees, protect the customer base and 
ensure that the new company is operating smoothly. The majority of the Internal 
Auditors agree (or strongly agree) that they can safeguard Internal Control Systems 
and the smooth operation, while 22.2% do not agree. 
 
Question 30. Cost saving consulting activities 
55.5% of those questioned agree that Internal Auditors can adopt a consulting role 
and by that act as a cost-saving activity. In contrast, 22.2% strongly agree with the 
statement. 
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Stage 5 of M&A macro model. Post-Acquisition Audit 
 
Question 31. The importance of Post-acquisition Audits 
Internal Auditors think that Post-Acquisition Audits can provide useful information 
about the M&A process.  
 
Question 32. Conflicts arise from M&As and Internal Auditors' ability to mitigate them 
According to the Internal Auditors, the accession of a special purpose audit to the 
annual audit plan can mitigate conflicts that may arise from the M&A process. 
Shareholders’ value creation metrics’ Findings 
Consistent with Sharma et. al, (2015), EVA, dividends paid and capital structure are 
used in order to examine the SVC. In more detail, according to the authors, negative 
EVA results interpret companies’ failure to generate shareholders’ value. Moreover, 
the authors state that shareholders are interested in dividends and D/E companies 
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seek to find the optimal capital structure. Therefore, these metrics were used for 22 
companies. The EVA will be tested against the following three criteria: 
1. Companies’ ability to create shareholders’ value (EVA>0) 
2. Each company’s EVA against EVA by industry15 for Western Europe, as 
reported by prof. Damodaran for the corresponding years 
3. If the EVA result before the M&A process is greater to the EVA post the M&A 
event 
 
The reason why each company’s EVA is compared with the zero and with EVA by 
industry is that industry’s EVA may be below zero due to other economic 
circumstances. D/E ratio and Dividends paid post-M&A are compared to the ones 
one year prior to M&A.  
The year 2015 nine companies were screened for their post-M&A performance. In 
the year 2014 six out of nine companies (67%) had EVA above zero. One year after 
the M&A the number was decreased by two, with the total percentage be formed at 
44%. When compared with EVA by industry two companies (22%) manage to have 
EVA above the industry prior to the event and three after the event (33%). Finally, 
only two companies (22%) had EVA post-M&A higher than the prior’s year. 
Regarding the D/E four out of nine (44%) managed to reduce it. Three companies 
paid higher dividend the year post-M&A. While five companies do not pay dividends 
at all years under scrutiny.  
The year 2016 the number of companies that were examined is five. In 2015 only 
one out of five (20%) had EVA higher than zero. Comparing one year after the event 
the number increased by two (60%). Moreover, two out of five (40%) had higher EVA 
by industry one year before the M&A and three (60%) after the M&A. Regarding EVA 
prior to and post the M&A, all the companies had higher results post the M&A 
compare the year after. One out of five reduced the D/E ratio. Moreover, two out of 
five (40%) distribute dividends when one of them proceeded to return of capital. 
When three (60%) companies did not pay any dividend. 
The year 2017 eight companies were examined. In 2016 two out of eight (25%) had 
EVA above zero, while in 2018 the number was formed to four (50%). The number of 
companies that had higher EVA results than the industry was three (38%) for both 
                                                          
15
 The amounts for the EVA by industry were converted into Euros by multiplying the dollar amounts 
with the annual exchange rates, calculated as the each month’s average. (Exchange rates retrieved 
from  https://www.taxheaven.gr/default/pages/vats/year/2019#) 
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the years 2016 and 2018. Five of the companies (63%) had greater EVA result post-
M&A compare to prior M&A. Three out of nine had D/E ratio reduced. Two out of 
eight or 25% distributed higher dividend after the M&A. When five did not distribute at 
all.  
Discussion 
This sections present questionnaires’ and Shareholders’ Value Creation’s findings 
discussion with references provided to section Literature Review.  
Discussion on Questionnaire 
The questionnaire provided to most of the questions mixed results as far as the role 
of the Internal Auditors during the stages of M&A. It is important to point out that the 
one third of the companies that responded belong to the same sector (bank) 
something that can influence the results since the responses were nine in total. 
Banks are obliged to follow certain laws and regulations, adopt specific practices and 
policies and establish discrete risk management processes. Moreover, because of 
the financial crisis, Greek banks are monitored by the European Committee (EC), 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Therefore, 
the practices applied and the Internal Audit Departments differ in many ways from the 
other companies.  
It is highlighted by the IIA that Internal Auditors must understand companies’ 
environment. From the questions of the first stage (Strategic Planning), we can 
observe that Internal Auditors are aware of companies’ characteristics and well 
informed about their strategy since top management gives them access to 
information. Cook (1993) and Selim et. al (2003), suggested that IA involvement at 
the earliest stages can aid not only to the overall effectiveness of the M&A process 
but also the business to chase all the opportunities. Although they are in a position to 
understand the purposes of the M&A process, Internal Auditors seem to be divided 
regarding their ability to assess the company’s readiness to proceed to an M&A and 
their ability to influence management decisions for an M&A (whether to procced or 
not). Therefore, even though that is involved in the strategic planning stage their 
ability to influence is deemed doubtful. According to Dounis (2007), manager’s belief 
that IA’s participation in the strategic decision may influence their objectivity, is a 
possible reason for IA does not involve in the M&A process. In this respect, 66.6% 
believe (agree and strongly agree) that they can mitigate conflicts that may arise at 
this stage, while 22,2% strongly disagree.  
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Selim et. al. (2003) pointed out that is vital not only to find suitable candidates but 
also ensure the right price and form a proper deal structure. Regarding candidates’ 
availability, the vast majority of the responders believe that candidates reflect the 
initial objectives of the M&A. Also, the majority (77.7%) believe that an adequate 
Deal Structure planning has been formed at this phase. In order to prepare the 
candidates’ list, the target evaluation should precede. Most of the responders believe 
that the valuation approach (income, market, asset) used was suitable for each 
candidate. Additionally, Internal Auditors believe that they can quantify and asses the 
risk of failure as far as the achievement of the company’s strategic and financial 
objectives. However, the responses were divided when asked whether they are in a 
position to use valuation techniques to provide alternative scenarios about synergies' 
outcome. As stated by Selim et. al. (2003), the high level of M&A failure, up to a point 
can be attributable to the companies being concentrated to make the deal done and 
many times do not focus on the planning and the post-integration. When asked about 
IA’s involvement at the “Specific Acquisition Planning Stage” the responses were 
bisected. The higher percentage was not clear (44.45%), 33% agree and strongly 
agree and 22.2% disagree and strongly disagree. Dounis (2007) argues that target 
company managers are reluctant to disclose information to the acquirer company 
either because the acquirer is a competitor or they don’t want to reveal control 
weakness and cause the deal price reduced. 66.7% of the responders do not support 
this statement since they believe that they have been provided with enough 
information to assess candidates’ control environment.  
As DD process concerns, the responders believe that the DD process used provided 
understandings of the target. The quality of the DD process can affect the outcome of 
the M&A since poor DD can lead to poor valuation and overprice. The responders 
believe that the each department’s manager is the one that understands better the 
risks that can be lurk at target companies’ corresponding department, thus they 
should participate in DD. In this context, it is deemed important from the responders 
to contact with target’s third parties to extract a more objective view. Regarding the 
consulting role of the IA in the third stage almost half believe that IA can provide 
objective did-offer. In this respect, all of the responders think that they can consult 
the company with the “walk-away” strategy. As mentioned to Selim et. al. (2003), 
during this stage companies need a mechanism to realize “reality check”, something 
that is justified by the responses (question 22).  
The essential aim of the integration plan is the two companies are integrated in a way 
that doesn’t add more turbulence (Dounis, 2007). Human resources and costumers’ 
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base consist of the riskiest areas at this phase (Selim et. al., 2003). IA believe 
(>77%) that they can assist the company to operate smoothly as far as the previous 
points concerns. Selim et, al. (2003), set descending order IA’s involvement in M&As. 
The stage that predominantly IA’s is involved in is the post-acquisition integration. In 
this content, 78% strongly agree and 22% agree that their current involvement in this 
stage is adequate. Additionally, IA believe that they can review and enhance further 
the integration plan and assist the company to meet its initial objectives.  
Despite their significance post-acquisition audits are often crowded out. This is 
mainly attributable to the company’s culture and to its willingness to emphasize on 
learning (Selim et. al., 2003). M&As are the biggest strategic move and affects not 
only the companies but also the communities that operate, thus valuable lessons for 
the future can are extracted when conducting special audits aiming at M&A. The 
majority of the IA supports the aforementioned statement. Moreover, according to IA 
M&A-oriented audits can succor to mitigate conflicts of interests that may arise from 
the M&A process.  
Both Selim et. al., (2003) and Dounis (2007), argue that the low levels of IA’s 
involvement can be attributable to department’s inherent limitations and the absence 
of necessary skills and knowledge. The questionnaire provided mix results to this 
aspect. Eight out of nine of the responders hold MSc and have more than ten years 
of experience. When asked about the IA department’s ability to participate in the deal 
structure phase, 55.5% are positive while 44.5% were neutral. Additionally, 55% 
agree and strongly agree that IA can act as a cost-saving by providing consulting 
activities such as compensation packages for managers’, while 33.3% disagree and 
strongly disagree (question 30). Contrary, when asked which are the main reasons 
behind the IAs’ noninvolvement in the M&A process, a practitioner response human 
resources limitation. This possibly can be attributable to sample companies’ size, 
nature and, needs. For instance, banks operate in very large and complex 
environment thus this requires a larger department staffed with skilled professionals 
from various backgrounds. As it is mentioned, the consulting role of the IA may 
jeopardize their objectivity. The responses to the relevant question were divided. 
Almost half believe that the consulting role will not threat their objectivity. Brody et, al. 
(2000), suggest that IA participation in negotiations hurts IA’s objectivity. In the 
question that broaches this matter the responses were reversed, with 44% agree and 
strongly agree that IA presence in negotiation meetings can be used as a negotiation 
tool, while 33.3% disagree and strongly disagree. Additionally, a practitioner 
response that IA don’t involve in M&A because their objectivity may be influenced. 
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Consistent with Dounis (2007), an IA stated that some companies think that the M&A 
process not rely on IA’s department field. In more detail, the IA stated that “some 
companies think that M&A belongs to commercial and financial activity 
exclusively”. According to another practitioner, IA’s low involvement is attributable 
to poor CG i.e. Bod synthesis, lack of sound internal controls, etc. When IA asked to 
describe their current role to the M&A process they stated that  
 she/he audit the process retrospectively (post-acquisition audit stage) 
 she/he participates to the risk-assessment process and the post-acquisition 
integration to evaluate the degree of integration  
 she/he provides advisory role.  
As for the Bank sector, an auditor stated that Banks are obliged by the Troika to sell 
thus they don’t proceed to M&As. In the third part of the questionnaire, auditors were 
called to describe their optative role aiming to provide an “adding-value” activity. It 
was stated that  
 partial audits should be added in every completed step in all stages of the 
M&A process 
 the consulting role should be enhanced in every stage and audit the level of 
integration in the post-acquisition stage 
 IA involvement in the risk–management process should be enhanced 
 More IA participation in DD as consultants.  
It worth to mention that the optative role by one auditor includes IA safeguard their 
objectivity. In more detail, it is pointed out that IA should not take management 
decisions or perform negotiation. 
Discussion on Shareholders’ Value Creation 
It is vital to be mentioned that the metrics, especially EVA calculation, are affected by 
the economic condition in the Greek market the years under scrutiny. The 
announcement of the referendum in June 2015 and the failure to reach an agreement 
with the Troika, triggered the beginning of an area of great uncertainty and political 
turbulences in Greece. As a result, the Athens Stock Exchange and the four 
commercial banks were remained closed for almost a month (July 2015). Greek 
companies’ creditworthiness was deteriorated, which was something that caused 
numerous problems, mainly to their liquidity.  
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When examined the whole sample of the companies for the years under scrutiny, we 
observe that 55% had higher EVA post-M&A performance, 36% experienced 
decreases concerning their D/E ratio and 32% paid more cash dividend. Moreover, 
the percentage of the companies that had higher EVA results after the M&A was 
formed at 41% compared to prior M&A (32%). Also, 50% of the companies create 
shareholders value (EVA>0) after the M&A, compared to 41% before M&A. As far as 
the D/E ratio and cash dividend concerns, 36% of the companies reduce D/E and 
32% distribute greater cash dividend. While, 59% of the companies don’t pay any 
dividends the tested years. Moreover, when companies announced their decision for 
not distributing cash dividend they stated that this is mainly attributable to overall 
economic conditions and their choice to reinvest these amounts. 
As was mentioned, companies’ EVA were compared to EVA by industry in order to 
eliminate cases where companies failed deliver positive values due to the sector’s 
conditions. The examined period the industries that presented negative EVA results 
were Retail (Buildings Supply), Steel and R.E.I.T. Three of the sample companies 
were included in these industries. Two out of three companies managed to had EVA 
results higher than the industries’ averages, while one had higher post-M&A EVA. 
Moreover, various reasons can influence the decision to proceed to M&A activities. 
Sometimes, managers may engage in M&A activities in order to improve companies’ 
financial position. In more detail, two companies that had negative EBIT, negative net 
asset and increased D/E ratio. The company after the M&A transaction managed to 
improve the EBIT, decrease D/E, enhance EVA (still remain negative) and give 
results higher than the industry. Contrary, two other companies’ metrics are 
worsened compared to the year prior to the M&A. Also, a company that had negative 
minority interest at carrying amounts at its balance sheet, after the M&A transaction 
improved its EVA results. Moreover, the aforementioned companies did not pay a 
cash dividend at all the examined years. Therefore, we can conclude that we are not 
able to extract any clear sign about this specific managers’ motive. 
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Conclusions, Recommendations and Limitations 
Finally, this section is divided into two sub-sections collocating the conclusions of the 
study regarding the role of Internal Auditors in M&As and Shareholders’ value 
creation the first year after the M&A is realized, and further recommendations and 
limitation.  
Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to examine the role of the Internal Auditors during the M&A 
process, as well as to test the firms’ ability to create shareholders’ value (SVC) the 
first year after the M&A. The sample consisted of the public companies that engaged 
in M&A transactions during the years 2015-2017 in Greece. Despite IA’s evolution 
from the traditional to consultancy role, Selim et. al. (2003), and Dounis (2007) stated 
that IA don’t involve in the M&A process in a formal and structured manner. 
Moreover, both studies concluded that IA’s active involvement in every stage of the 
M&A can add value and have a positive contribution to M&A effectiveness. 
Nonetheless, findings in both studies raised specific reasons why IA don’t have 
active involvement in M&As. These reasons predominantly lie in IA’s department 
inherent limitations (human resources, lack of skills and knowledge), IAs level of 
accessibility and management’s perceptions about the IAs’ role. 
To be able to get a thorough view on the role of the IAs, questionnaires were sent to 
the companies of the sample. However, they provided mixed results on IA’s role in 
M&A. The fact that one-third of the responders belong to the Banking sector have 
influenced the study’s results. This sector is obliged to follow certain rules and 
regulations, thus their IA department differs in many ways from other companies. 
Regarding the transaction’s stages, the IAs provided clear answers with respect to 
the strategic planning. Although there was some vagueness when evaluating the 
company’s readiness to proceed to an M&A. The IAs provided answers in the same 
manner throughout the whole process of the questionnaire. We have to highlight that 
the importance of Post-acquisition audits it’s emphasized from the IA, by adding that 
this type of audits can succor to mitigate conflicts raised from the M&A process.  
Concerning the IA department’s inherent limitations, the study provided mixed 
results, as stated above. Even though the vast majority of the IA are experienced 
practitioners and hold MSc, the responders were divided in respect of the IA 
department’s ability to participate in the deal structure process and their ability to use 
evaluation techniques. However, the questionnaire’s findings seem to consent with 
those of the previous studies regarding managements’ perception of IA. Even though 
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IAs have access to enough information from both acquires’ and targets’ top 
management, they were divided concerning their ability to influence management. 
Moreover, a practitioner stated that managers often believe that M&As don't lie in 
IA’s department expertise. Moreover, this study revealed that IA’s low involvement 
can be attributable to poor Corporate Governance mechanisms and to the risk of IA’s 
objectivity be influenced. The responders believe that their dual role should be 
enhanced during the whole M&A process, but they were divided on whether this 
could impair their objectivity. As it is emphasized by the IIA, authors and it is stated 
from a practitioner IAs’ optative role requires them to safeguard their objectivity.   
Given the high rates of M&A failure to create shareholders’ value and the IA’s main 
aim to preserve and enhance organization’s value, in this study companies’ EVA, D/E 
ratio and cash dividends paid have been examined one-year prior and one-year post-
M&A. Approximately, half of the companies provided better post-M&A results with 
respect to the three EVA criteria. As far as the D/E and the cash dividends paid, 
almost the one third managed to decrease D/E after the M&A and the one third 
distribute higher cash dividends. While 59% do not pay any dividends at all. 
Therefore, we are not able to extract any clear sign about companies’ post-M&A 
performance and its impact on the shareholders’ value creation. 
Recommendations and Limitations 
As it was mentioned, IA’s aim and organization’s value are intertwined. On the other 
hand, M&As are very large and complex transactions, which directly impact both 
companies that participate and the community that are operating. This study tried to 
link IA’s role in contemporary Greek business with its positive contribution to M&As’ 
effectiveness. For IA’s role in M&A being examined questionnaires were sent to the 
sample of companies. It is known that questionnaires often provide lower quality of 
results compared to interviews or other means of research. Even though the number 
of M&As in Greece has been increased compared to the previous years, maybe 
another market will provide a larger sample and thus will probably give better results. 
Moreover, the high concentration of one sector has a significant influence on the 
results. Hence, it would be interesting if other studies examine a specific sector. It 
was pointed out from both basic studies that the IA department lacks skills and 
knowledge to cope with such a transaction. Therefore, it is recommended that next 
studies put greater emphasis on that aspect (ex whether IAs hold any professional 
designation i.e. CIA, ACCA, ACA, etc.) In this content, it would be really insightful to 
seek AC’s and top management’s view regarding the IA’s role in M&As. Given the 
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high levels of M&A failure this study tried to examine the company’s ability to create 
shareholders value (SVC) the first year after the M&A is realized. Wishing to examine 
the role of internal auditors in the most recent time frame, I have chosen the period 
from 2015 to 2017. However, it is of high importance to mention that the years under 
scrutiny represent maybe the most uncertain and difficult period for the Greek 
companies, thus the results, especially for the WACC, could be affected. In this 
respect, it would be more representative, if the next studies use other time frame. 
Moreover, the impact of an M&A in SVC will be better assessed in a larger time 
frame; greater than one year after the transaction is realized. Additionally, EVA, cash 
dividends and D/E ratio are some of the determinants of SVC, thus it would be very 
interesting if other studies examine more SVC determinants and the relation between 
them. Moreover, to screen a company’s post-M&A performance and thus M&A 
effectiveness more ratios or other research means should be applied. 
  
47 
 
References 
 Abbott, L. J., Parker, S., & Peters, G. F. (2010). Serving two masters: The 
association between audit committee internal audit oversight and internal 
audit activities. Accounting Horizons, 24(1), 1-24. 
 Agarwal, P., & Mittal, R. (2014). Mergers and acquisitions analysis with the 
case study method. International Journal of Management and Commerce 
Innovations, 2(1), 236-244. 
 Agorastos, K., Pazarskis, M., & Karagiorgos, T. (2012). The Post-Merger 
Performance of Acquiring Listed Firms among Different Industries in Greece. 
 Alexandridis, G., Antypas, N., & Travlos, N. (2017). Value creation from 
M&As: New evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance, 45, 632-650. 
 Antoniadis, I., Lazarides, T., Sarrianidis, N., & Goupa, H. (2008). The impact 
of Agency Problem in Firm value and the Greek Stock Exchange Market 
Financial Crisis. In International Conference on Applied Economics–ICOAE 
(p. 27). 
 Bajaj, M., & Vijh, A. M. (1990). Dividend clienteles and the information content 
of dividend changes. Journal of Financial Economics, 26(2), 193-219. 
 Barney, J., Wright, M., & Ketchen Jr, D. J. (2001). The resource-based view 
of the firm: Ten years after 1991. Journal of management, 27(6), 625-641. 
 Berkovitch, E., & Narayanan, M. P. (1993). Motives for takeovers: An 
empirical investigation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative analysis, 28(3), 
347-362. 
 Berle, A. A., and G. Means, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, The Macmillan Company, New York. 
 Brealey, R., Myers, S., Allen, F., & Mohanty, P. (2014). Principles of 
Corporate Finance, 11e. McGraw-Hill Education. 
 Brody, R. G., & Lowe, D. J. (2000). The new role of the internal auditor: 
Implications for internal auditor objectivity. International Journal of Auditing, 
4(2), 169-176. 
 Bruner, F. (2004). Applied Mergers and acquisitions. John Wiley & Sons. 
 Caratas, M. A., & Spatariu, E. C. (2014). Contemporary approaches in 
internal audit. Procedia Economics and Finance, 15, 530-537. 
 Carcello, J. V., Hermanson, D. R., & Raghunandan, K. (2005). Changes in 
internal auditing during the time of the major US accounting scandals. 
International Journal of Auditing, 9(2), 117-127. 
48 
 
 Chambers, R. (2017, July). Internal Auditing and the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution. Internal Auditor. Retrieved from 
https://iaonline.theiia.org/blogs/chambers/2017/Pages/Internal-Auditing-and-the-
Fourth-Industrial-Revolution.aspx 
 Christopher, J., Sarens, G., & Leung, P. (2009). A critical analysis of the 
independence of the internal audit function: evidence from Australia. 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 22(2), 200-220. 
 Cigna, G.P., Kobel Y., Sigheartau A. (2016). Corporate Governance in 
Transition Economies Greece Country Report. Retrieved from European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
https://www.ebrd.com/documents/legal-reform/greece.PDF 
 Cook, R. (1993). Auditing Acquisitions: Part 1 – Implementing Acquisitions 
Strategies. Managerial Auditing Journal, 8(1) 
 Creighton, K., (2013). Introduction to Mergers & Acquisition. Retrieved from 
https://openlibrary.org/works/OL17157367W/Introduction_to_Mergers_Acquisi
tions 
 DePamphilis, D (2010). Mergers, Acquisitions, and other restricting activities. 
Academic Press. 
 Dounis, N. (2007). The role of internal auditing during mergers & acquisitions: 
the European Union experience (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from 
https://www.iia.nl/SiteFiles/Publicaties/M_A_EuropeanExperience.pdf 
 Ernst Young (2013). Growing Beyond: a place for integrity 12th Global Fraud 
Survey. Retrieved from: https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-12-
Global-Fraud-Survey/$FILE/ey-12th-global-fraud-survey.pdf 
 Ernst Young (2013). Internal Audit’s role during the strategic transactions life 
cycle. Retrieved from 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Internal_audits_role_in_strategic_tra
nsactions/$FILE/Insights_on_GRC_IA_during_strategic_transactions_AU1565.pdf 
 FERMA. ECIIA. (2010). Guidance on the 8th EU Company Law Directive 
article 41. Retrieved from: https://www.iia.nl/SiteFiles/ECIIA%20FERMA.pdf 
 Goodwin, J., & Yeo, T. Y. (2001). Two factors affecting internal audit 
independence and objectivity: evidence from Singapore. International Journal 
of Auditing, 5(2), 107-125. 
 Gorton, G., Kahl, M., & Rosen, R. (2005). Eat or be eaten: A theory of 
mergers and merger waves (No. w11364). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
49 
 
 Griffiths, P. (2005). Risk-based auditing. USA: Gower Publishing Company 
 Grullon, G., & Michaely, R. (2004). The information content of share 
repurchases programs. The Journal of Finance, 59(2), 651-680. 
 Ha, I., Hong, G., & Lee, B. S. (2011). Information content of dividends and 
share repurchases. Asia‐Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 40(4), 517-549. 
 Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G., & Ruback, R. S. (1992). Does corporate 
performance improve after mergers?. Journal of financial economics, 31(2), 
135-175. 
 Hellenic Capital Market Commission (2016). Annual Report 2015. Retrieved 
from: 
http://www.hcmc.gr/aweb/files/Annual_Reports/files/HCMC%20Annual%20Report
%202015.pdf 
 Hellenic Capital Market Commission (2017). Annual Report 2016. Retrieved 
from: 
http://www.hcmc.gr/aweb/files/Annual_Reports/files/HCMC%20Annual%20Report
%202016_final.pdf 
 Hellenic Capital Market Commission (2018). Annual Report 2017. Retrieved 
from: 
http://www.hcmc.gr/aweb/files/Annual_Reports/files/Annual%20Report%202017_
eng.pdf 
 Hitt, M. A., King, D. R., Krishnan, H., Makri, M., Schijven, M., Shimizu, K., & 
Zhu, H. (2012). Creating value through mergers and acquisitions: Challenges 
and opportunities. 
 Humphery‐Jenner, M. (2014). Takeover defenses, innovation, and value 
creation: Evidence from acquisition decisions. Strategic Management Journal, 
35(5), 668-690. 
 Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) (2013), Code of Ethics, Retrieved from: 
https://na.theiia.org/special-promotion/PublicDocuments/Code%20of%20Ethics.pdf 
 Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) (2017), Implementation Guidance, Retrieved 
from: https://www.aiiaweb.it/sites/default/files/imce/pdf/ig1100-independence-
and-objectivity.pdf 
 Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) (2017), International Standards for the 
professional practice of internal auditing (standards), Retrieved from  
https://na.theiia.org/standards-guidance/Public%20Documents/IPPF-
Standards-2017.pdf 
50 
 
 International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), Retrieved from: 
https://www.ifac.org/system/files/downloads/a034-2010-iaasb-handbook-isa-
610.pdf 
 Khelil, I., Hussainey, K., & Noubbigh, H. (2016). Audit committee–internal 
audit interaction and moral courage. Managerial Auditing Journal, 31(4/5), 
403-433. 
 King, D. R., Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., & Covin, J. G. (2004). Meta‐analyses 
of post‐acquisition performance: Indications of unidentified moderators. 
Strategic management journal, 25(2), 187-200. 
 Lazarides, T. (2011). Corporate governance legal and regulatory framework's 
effectiveness in Greece: A response. Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance, 19(3), 244-253 
 Maditinos, I. D., Sevic, Z., & Theriou, N. G. (2006). The introduction of 
economic value added (EVA) in the corporate world. The Southeuropean 
Review of Business and Accounting, 4(2), 1-11. 
 Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2007). Corporate governance and 
acquirer returns. The Journal of Finance, 62(4), 1851-1889. 
 McKinsey & Company. (2000). Investor Opinion Survey. Retrieved from  
https://www.ebrd.com/documents/legal-reform/greece.PDF 
 Meek, T. (2017, July).  How Humans And AI Will Share The Auditing Function 
Of The Future. Forbes. Retrieved from 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/workday/2017/07/10/how-humans-and-ai-will-
share-the-auditing-function-of-the-future/#5a86b3ef4fa1 
 Messier, W. F., Glover, S. M., & Prawitt, D. F. (2012). Auditing & assurance 
services: A systematic approach. Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill Irwin. 
 Mueller, D. (1997). Merger Policy in the United States: A Reconsideration. 
Review of Industrial Organization, 12(5/6), 655-685. Retrieved from 
www.jstor.org/stable/41798771 
 O'Byrne, S. F. (1996), EVA® AND MARKET VALUE. Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance, 9(1), 116-126. 
 Okodo, D., Momoh, M. A., & Yahaya, A. O. (2019). Assessing the Reliability 
of Internal Audit Functions: The Issues. Journal of Contemporary Research in 
Business, Economics and Finance, 1(1), 46-55. 
 Papadakis, V. M., & Thanos, I. C. (2010). Measuring the performance of 
acquisitions: An empirical investigation using multiple criteria. British Journal 
of Management, 21(4), 859-873. 
51 
 
 Parvinen, P., & Tikkanen, H. (2007). Incentive asymmetries in the mergers 
and acquisitions process. Journal of Management Studies, 44(5), 759-787. 
 Pazarskis, M., Drogalas, G., & Koutoupis, A. (2018). Mergers and accounting 
performance: Some evidence from Greece during the economic crisis. 
Accounting and Management Informatio n Systems, 17(1), 31-45. 
 PricewaterCooper (2014). Deals in Greece 2013 Turning the corner. 
Retrieved from: https://www.pwc.com/gr/en/publications/assets/deals-2013-in-
greece.pdf 
 PricewaterCooper (2015). Deals in Greece 2014. Retrieved from: 
https://www.pwc.com/gr/en/publications/assets/deals2014.pdf 
 PricewaterCooper (2016). Deals in Greece 2015 Very few, but then more 
than expected. Retrieved from: https://www.pwc.com/gr/en/publications/deals-
in-greece-2015-eng.pdf 
 PricewaterCooper (2017). Deals in Greece 2016 Disposal of non-core assets 
by systemic banks. Retrieved from: 
https://www.pwc.com/gr/en/publications/greek-thought-leadership/deals-greece-
2016-en.pdf 
 PricewaterCooper (2019). Deals in Greece 2018 The new era following the 
completion of the Greek banks’ divestment plans. Retrieved from: 
https://www.pwc.com/gr/en/publications/greek-thought-leadership/deals-in-
greece-2018-en.pdf 
 Roberts, A., Wallace, W., Moles, P. (2012). Mergers and acquisition. Heriot-
watt university. 
 Sarens, G., & De Beelde, I. (2006). The relationship between internal audit 
and senior management: A qualitative analysis of expectations and 
perceptions. International Journal of Auditing, 10(3), 219-241. 
 Sarens, G., Abdolmohammadi, M. J., & Lenz, R. (2012). Factors associated 
with the internal audit function's role in corporate governance. Journal of 
Applied Accounting Research, 13(2), 191-204. 
 Selim, G. M., Sudarsanam, S., & Lavine, M. (2003). The role of internal 
auditors in mergers, acquisitions and divestitures: an international study. 
International Journal of Auditing, 7(3), 223-245. 
 Selim, G., Woodward, S., & Allegrini, M. (2009). Internal auditing and 
consulting practice: A comparison between UK/Ireland and Italy. International 
Journal of Auditing, 13(1), 9-25. 
52 
 
 Sharma, P. & Grover, A. (2015). Creating and measuring shareholders’ value 
in Indian companies. International Journal of Applied Business and Economic 
Research, 13(1), 53-66. 
 Sherman, A. (2006). Mergers and Acquisitions from A to Z. New York; 
Atlanta; Brussels; Chicago; Mexico City; San Francisco; Shanghai; Tokyo; 
Toronto; Washington, D.C.: AMACOM Division of American Management 
Association International. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1d2qzxj 
 Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1989). Management entrenchment: The case of 
manager-specific investments. Journal of financial economics, 25(1), 123-
139. 
 Sirower, M. L., & O'Byrne, S. F. (1998). The measurement of post‐acquisition 
performance: toward a value‐based benchmarking methodology. Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, 11(2), 107-121. 
 Stewart, G. B. (1994), EVA™: FAST AND FANTASY. Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance, 7(2), 71-84. 
 Van Peursem, K. (2004). Internal auditors’ role and authority: New Zealand 
evidence. Managerial Auditing Journal, 19(3), 378-393. 
 Woolridge, J. R. (1982). The information content of dividend changes. Journal 
of Financial Research, 5(3), 237-247. 
 Xiao, X., & Tan, L. (2009, June). Research of M&A Performance of Listed 
Companies in China based on EVA. In 2009 International Conference on 
Electronic Commerce and Business Intelligence (pp. 337-340). IEEE. 
 Yook, K. C. (2004). The measurement of post-acquisition performance using 
EVA. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 43(3-4), 67-84. 
 Zain, M. M., & Subramaniam, N. (2007). Internal auditor perceptions on audit 
committee interactions: A qualitative study in Malaysian public corporations. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(5), 894-908. 
